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Competition and contracts in the Nordic residential electricity markets 
 
Stephen Littlechild* 
14 September 2005 
 
Abstract 
 
The main Nordic residential electricity markets (Norway, Sweden and Finland) 
effectively opened to retail competition around 1998. They have not been subject to 
regulatory controls on prices or other contract terms. Competition is developing well. 
Between 11 and 29 per cent of residential customers have switched to alternative 
suppliers. Between a fifth and a half of all residential customers have voluntarily 
chosen alternative contractual terms of supply, with either an alternative supplier or 
their local supplier. These alternatives include fixed price contracts ranging from 3 
months to five years duration, as well as spot-price related terms, instead of the 
standard variable tariffs. The use of these alternatives is increasing over time, and 
there is considerable product innovation. This paper surveys these developments and 
illustrates with case studies of significant suppliers in each Nordic market. The market 
is thus ascertaining and bringing about the outcomes that customers prefer. If markets 
are not open to retail competition, it is not clear how regulation will replicate this 
aspect of the market process. 
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I  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
There has been considerable discussion about the merits or otherwise of retail 
competition for residential electricity customers. Evidence has been drawn almost 
entirely from the UK and US.1 There is, however, another set of markets that were 
effectively opened to retail competition at the residential level around 1998, at about 
the same time as the UK market, namely, the three main Nordic electricity markets 
(Norway, Sweden and Finland). They can therefore provide some useful evidence on 
the possible performance and contribution of such markets. 
 
The electricity sectors in these three countries were reformed over the period 1991 to 
1996. With some qualifications, these reforms have been regarded as successful.2 Of 
particular interest for present purposes is that the Nordic markets were not subject to 
regulatory controls on prices or other contract terms. Retail competition has 
developed well in all three markets. The proportion of customers switching to 
alternative suppliers is lower than in the UK but generally higher than in other 
countries. An especially interesting feature of the Nordic markets is that a significant 
proportion of residential customers has actively chosen terms of supply other than the 
standard variable tariff. The chosen alternatives include fixed prices for defined 
periods of time, and prices explicitly linked to the NordPool spot price. 
 
The paper begins with a brief account of the structure and regulatory framework of 
the Nordic markets generally. It then examines the origins, nature and estimated 
extent of these alternative contracts, taking each Nordic market in turn. It also 
illustrates with case studies of significant suppliers in each market. A final section 
summarises and concludes.  
 
The paper does not attempt a full appraisal of the costs and benefits of retail 
competition. For example, it does not have access to data on costs of IT and 
marketing, nor on retail margins. Nevertheless, it hopefully adds an additional 
dimension to the debate, which has hitherto focused almost entirely on the price of a 
standardised product. 
 
An Appendix summarises the main physical and market characteristics of these 
Nordic markets and their regulatory frameworks. There is some limited comparison 
with the UK, which in some ways is a benchmark for residential retail competition 
                                                 
1 On the UK see for example Green and McDaniel (1998), Salies and Waddams Price (2004), Giulietti 
et al (2004, 2006), Davies et al (2005), Green (2005) and Newbery (2006). On the US and more 
generally see Joskow (2000a,b, 2005, 2006) and Tschamler (2006), and on Texas see Baldick and Niu 
(2006) and Adib and Zarnikau (2006). My own writings on this topic include Littlechild (2001a,b, 
2002, 2003a,b, 2004, 2005a,b). The volumes edited by Glachant and Finon (2003), Griffin and Puller 
(2005) and Sioshanshi and Pfaffenburger (2006) also contain some discussion of retail competition in 
other countries. Von der Fehr et al (2005, 2006) discuss retail competition and contracts in the Nordic 
countries, but mainly for the light that it sheds on the extent of competition generally, especially in 
Sweden versus Norway. 
2 E.g. Bergman (2002, 2005), Hjalmarsson (2002), Amundsen and Bergman (2003), Swedish Energy 
Agency (2004) (henceforth STEM 2004), von der Fehr et al (2005, 2006). The present paper does not 
cover the Danish market, which linked up with the other Nordic markets somewhat later and has not 
been at the forefront of retail competition.  
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1.2 Nordic market opening and the retail regulatory framework 
 
Electricity deregulation and reform began in Norway in 1991, followed by Finland 
and Sweden in 1995/96. In all three countries, retail competition at the residential 
level was not effective at first because customers were required to install a new meter 
to measure consumption on an hourly basis, and the cost of this was largely 
prohibitive.3 Only after the introduction of profiling did retail competition become 
feasible for residential customers. This happened in the period 1997 to 1999, at about 
the same time as the residential market opened (with profiling) in the UK. 
 
The high electricity consumption of Nordic households - some two to four times the 
UK and OECD average - provides an incentive for such customers to take an active 
interest in the market. The generation context is at first sight not conducive to retail 
competition, since the largest company in each country, typically state-owned, 
accounts for about 40 to 50 per cent of total generation (taking account of extensive 
cross-ownership). But the commonly accessed NordPool spot and forwards markets 
provide some counterweight to this (see Appendix). 
 
The Nordic regulatory framework is conducive to retail competition, at least within 
each country.4 In all three countries there is regulated third party access to 
transmission and distribution networks (as in most European countries except 
Germany). Although vertical integration is common, there is a high degree of 
accounting, management, legal and ownership separation of generation, transmission, 
distribution and supply.5 
 
In none of the Nordic countries have there been controls on prices, either before or 
after liberalisation. This may reflect the extent of public ownership, both by the 
national states and by municipalities. 
 
In other respects, too, regulation of the competitive retail market is relatively light and 
simple, especially in Norway and Sweden. Incumbent suppliers are typically required 
to offer to customers within their area a standard tariff that is variable at two weeks’ 
notice (four weeks in Finland). Customers can leave tariff this by giving due notice, 
generally without a fee (albeit with some restrictions in Finland). These suppliers can 
and do offer other kinds of contract, such as fixed term contracts or spot price 
contracts. Customers can change easily from a distribution company’s standard tariff 
to a fixed-term or spot price contract with the same distribution company, typically 
within a day or two. Apart from a short compulsory ‘cooling off period’ applying to 
                                                 
3 Thus in Sweden, “For a household, the cost was around EUR 1000. Later on, the network companies 
were obliged to install the required type of meter at a maximum cost of EUR 270.” (Bergman 2002, fn 
22, p. 32) 
4 Von der Fehr et al (2005, 2006) note some obstacles to transactions between suppliers in one country 
and customers in another, which may partly account for price differences between the Nordic countries. 
5 Norway was once judged to have the highest liberalisation indicators (competition and non-
competition) of seven leading countries in Europe, just ahead of the UK. Sweden and Finland were 
recorded as having similar characteristics. Energy Liberalisation Indicators in Europe, a consultation 
paper based on a study carried out by Oxera for the Governments of the UK and the Netherlands. 
October 2000. 
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contracts generally, there are no constraints on the prices or other contract terms that 
suppliers can offer outside their own areas.6  
 
Unlike the UK, distribution companies rather than retail suppliers are responsible for 
metering and meter reading, and there is no competition in metering services. Nordic 
regulators have seen no need for any regulatory check of companies’ data processing 
systems or for accreditation of new suppliers or service providers. In contrast, such 
checking and accreditation has been expensive and time consuming in the UK.7  
 
The basic Nordic model is two bills, one for supply and one for the local distribution 
grid. In practice the vertically integrated companies often combine these into one bill 
for their own customers. There is provision for the grid company to bill other 
suppliers on request so that these suppliers too can send one bill to their customers. 
This option is not much used in Norway since the local grid companies are 
accustomed to bill customers for broadband and other products. In Finland there is an 
extra charge to the customer for this option, and discussions are underway between 
the companies to resolve the issue.8  
 
1.3 Retail supply characteristics of the Nordic markets 
 
When the Nordic markets first opened there were over 600 different suppliers in total. 
Most of these were relatively small regional and municipal utilities. Since then there 
has been considerable consolidation, with the largest companies taking over the 
middle-sized as well as smaller ones. The total number of suppliers has roughly 
halved, so in total there are still about 300 suppliers. However, about two thirds of 
these companies do not offer supply outside their traditional geographic areas within 
their own country. Table 1a shows that between 30 and 80 suppliers are regarded as 
national suppliers in each country. 
 
Table 1a Supply competition in the Nordic electricity markets. 
 
Country Norway Sweden Finland Great 
Britain 
Deregulation begins 1991 1996 1995/6 1990 
Residential retail market 
effectively open 
1997/8 1999 1998 1998/9 
                                                 
6 This contrasts with the UK, where there is a requirement that residential customers must be able to 
terminate any energy contract at 28 days’ notice. UK suppliers must also offer a variety of payment 
methods. Littlechild (2005a,b) and discussion in the Conclusions below. 
7 The UK seems to be the exception internationally in terms of competition in metering services. At 
present, accreditation can cost about £0.25 million and take some 2 to 3 months in the UK. Elexon has 
suggested some possibilities for simplification and reform. Littlechild (2005a) 
8 Accuracy and frequency of meter-reading has been an issue in many countries. Sweden is taking 
some steps to improve investment here. “In order to facilitate supplier changes and give electricity 
customers a more direct connection between consumption and billing, the government [of Sweden] has 
passed a decision [in 2003] to introduce monthly metering of electricity usage among all electricity 
customers by 1 July 2009. Within the given timeframe, the network companies are free to decide the 
pace of implementation. The cost of the reform is estimated at around SEK 10 billion and will be paid 
for by the end consumers.” The Electricity Year 2003, Swede Energy, p. 7. This represents about 
US$300 per household. Some companies in Norway have urged similar investment. NVE recommends 
that all distribution companies should offer to provide two-way communication at a fixed rate, and 
encourages a step-by-step development, but is not convinced that a total implementation would be 
economic at present.  
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Number of suppliers 
c 1996 >150 250 117 14 
c 2004/5 total 130 126 70 10-15 
c 2004/5 national 30 79 40 10-15 
Source: Lewis et al 2004, Fosse 2005 and reports and information from regulatory bodies. 
 
The large national generating companies, that often supply most customers, were and 
still are mostly publicly owned, although foreign ownership is increasing.9 In all three 
Nordic markets, the largest three or four integrated companies supply between a half 
and two thirds of the total market, as well as the majority of generation. Thus, in 
Sweden the Big Three companies (Vattenfall, Sydkraft and Fortum) account for about 
86 per cent of generation and about 70 per cent of end-customer sales. 10 
 
Table 1b Market concentration in Nordic electricity supply markets 
 
Country Norway Sweden Finland Great Britain 
 
Total market (generally by kWh) 
Largest supplier 30-40 25-35? ? 25 
Largest 3 suppliers 50-60 70 30-3511 60 
Largest 6 suppliers 60-65 >70 >35 85-90 
 
Residential sector (generally by customers) 
Largest supplier 20-25 >>13 15-20? 22 
Largest 3 suppliers  35 ? 35-40? 59 
Largest 6 suppliers  45-50 ? 55-60? 99 
Source: Lewis et al 2004, Fosse 2005 and reports and information from regulatory bodies. 
 
Although estimation of market shares is difficult because of cross-ownership, the 
residential sector seems less concentrated than the market as a whole, particularly 
compared to the UK. Retailers other than the largest six suppliers account for between 
a quarter and a half of the Nordic residential sectors compared to less than 1 per cent 
in the UK. 
 
Even the largest Nordic companies are relatively small in terms of their customer 
numbers. British Gas Centrica, now the largest UK residential electricity supplier, has 
as many customers as the total number of electricity customers in all of Sweden. The 
other five major UK electricity suppliers have more customers each than the total 
number of customers in Norway or Finland. Nevertheless, in all three Nordic 
                                                 
9 Vattenfall and Statkraft are 100% state owned in Sweden and Norway, respectively. Fortum is a 
quoted company on the Helsinki stock exchange, with the Finnish state owning nearly 60 per cent. 
Sydkraft was formerly quoted on the Stockholm stock exchange; it was delisted in May 2001 and is 
now 55% owned by the German company E.ON and 44.6% owned by Statkraft. “Between 1996 and 
2001, foreign ownership of Swedish power generators increased from 13 to 40 per cent.” (STEM 2004, 
p.19) See also Midttun et al 2003. 
10 “When the electricity market was deregulated, seven companies accounted for 90 per cent of the 
power generated in Sweden. Today, three companies account for 86 per cent.” The 2003 shares of these 
Big Three companies and their associates (via minority ownership and partnership) were Vattenfall 
46.5%, Sydkraft 20.5% and Fortum 24.7%. Shortly afterwards Sydkraft purchased Graninge 1.8%. 
STEM 2004, p. 19, and p. 21 for retail sales. See also Lewis et al 2004. 
11 The percentage in Finland refers to total supply through the distribution network, excluding very 
large industrial users (forest industry) that buy in the wholesale market and account for about half of 
total electricity consumption in Finland. 
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countries, not only the main suppliers but also some of the (even) smaller municipal 
suppliers have been active and effective retail competitors.  
 
II THE RETAIL ELECTRICITY MARKET IN SWEDEN 
 
2.1 The development of residential competition and contracts in Sweden 
 
Traditionally, incumbent electricity suppliers offered only a standard tariff, variable at 
short notice. This would have some reference to NordPool prices, but many suppliers 
priced with reference to their own generation. In consequence, standard variable tariff 
prices generally followed spot prices, but they were higher, smoother and somewhat 
lagged. Spot price during 1997 to 2000 was generally lower than it had been in 
previous years, which left average standard tariff price more than double the average 
spot price over this period. Spot prices rose in 2001 and 2002, then peaked sharply in 
winter of 2002/3 after the exceptionally dry year 2002 (Figure 1). During January 
2003, when spot price was about five times its usual level, standard tariff prices were 
actually below spot price (see Table 2). 
 
Figure 1 NordPool spot price 1998-2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One competitor began to offer fixed price fixed-term contracts from mid-1997 
onwards (see section 2.3.1 below), but it was not until the metering requirement was 
relaxed that competition became active more widely. Contract prices generally 
undercut standard tariff prices, initially by up to 30% but in later years by less than 
that.12 Competitors also offered spot price contracts with a fixed margin added to 
cover costs. Gradually the incumbents responded by offering similar contracts, 
including to their own customers. So-called “active customers” comprise those that 
have switched supplier plus those that have changed from tariff to contract while 
staying with their local supplier.  
 
Table 2 Typical energy charges in Sweden over time (ore/kWh as at 1 January) 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Spot price (1 20.0 20.3 16.3 13.6 15.2 16.9 19.8 51.4 24.7 
                                                 
12 Contract prices have occasionally been below spot prices but above tariff prices, as in winter 2002/3 
when tariff prices lagged behind the sharp rise in spot market prices. 
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January) 
Spot price (yr) 25.1 13.3 11.4 11.3 11.5 18.4 20.6 28.9 23.5 
Standard tariff 26.7 27.6 26.8 26.3 23.4 24.2 31.6 47.1 50.7 
Fixed price 
contract 
   19 18-21 21-30 28-52 52-40 ? 
Source: mainly SCB  
 
Regular consumer surveys by the organisation TEMO provide information about the 
behaviour of customers in Sweden (Table 3). According to these surveys, in 2000 
nearly twice as many customers had changed to a contract with their local supplier as 
had switched to another supplier. But the number of switchers increased more rapidly. 
By October 2004 29 per cent of customers had switched supplier compared to 25 per 
cent that had changed to a contract with their existing supplier. Over half the 
consumers in Sweden are now ‘active’ in one way or another.  
 
Table 3 Estimated proportions of active residential customers in Sweden (%) 
 
      2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Switched to new supplier   10 13 18 23 29 
Signed contract with local supplier  18 17 17 22 25 
Total active customers   28 30 35 45 54 
Customers on Standard tariffs (not active) 72 70 65 55 46 
Total customers    100 100 100 100 100 
Source: TEMO13 
 
Over the last year, the Central Bureau of Statistics (SCB) in Sweden has begun to 
collect and publish data based on returns by distribution companies.14 These suggest 
that the above survey figures may overstate the proportion of active customers. 
According to SCB figures (see Table 5b below), in May 2004 customers still on the 
standard tariff took 56.8 per cent of residential electricity. It is not impossible that 
customers on the standard tariff have a higher average consumption than active 
consumers, but the opposite seems more likely. In any event, by May 2005 consumers 
on standard tariffs took only 49.6 per cent of residential electricity, so it is still the 
case that about half the residential consumers in Sweden are now ‘active’. 
 
With this qualification in mind, the TEMO surveys provide further interesting 
insights. Table 4 shows that customers in the three major cities are more likely to 
switch supplier than customers in other areas. Customers in rural areas are more likely 
to sign contracts with existing suppliers. The degree and nature of activity in the retail 
market is also related to size of electricity bill. Just as industrial customers are more 
active than residential, so too larger households are more active than small. Customers 
in houses are more likely to be active than those in apartments. They are more than 
twice as likely to sign contracts with existing suppliers than are customers in 
apartments.15 There are fewer such variations in the UK.16 
                                                 
13 TEMO 2004, slides 22, 23, 30, 38, taking latest available data for each year. This is the source of the 
data for 2000 and 2003 reported in STEM 2004. These data are based on interviews with a sample of 
1000 customers. See also comment in text re SCB figures. 
14 http://www.scb.se/templates/tableOrChart____92219.asp  
15 The lower proportion in apartments may reflect lower potential savings from lower usage, or rental 
versus ownership, or the predominance of district heating in apartments in urban areas. There is 
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Table 4 Switching by customer type in Sweden October 2004 
Customer type Switched 
supplier % 
Contract with 
existing supplier % 
Total active % 
Overall total 2004 29 25 54 
    
In Stockholm, 
Gothenburg, Malmo 
38 23 61 
In other cities 25 25 50 
In rural areas 26 35 61 
    
Houses  30 31 61 
Apartments 26 13 39 
Source: TEMO 2004 slide 24 
 
About 42 per cent of customers that have changed supplier say it was difficult to 
compare prices. However, only about 11 per cent say that it was complicated to 
switch.17 About 87 per cent say that they are content with how the switch worked. 
These percentages have remained broadly constant over the last four years. There has 
been a gradual increase in the proportion of customers that have switched supplier 
twice (now up to 26 per cent of those who have ever changed supplier) and some have 
switched three or more times (now up to 9 per cent). Reasons given by those who had 
not been active were lack of interest (about 16%), too little gain (14%), too 
complicated (12%), live in an apartment (12%), use so little electricity (6%), hard to 
choose (3%) and ‘other answers’ (37%). About 20 per cent of these inactive 
customers were intending to change supplier or thought they might do so.18 
 
Table 5a shows that customers have chosen a variety of different products. The 
TEMO survey suggests that spot contracts and one-year fixed-price contracts have 
been more popular with customers who switched supplier; two- and three-year fixed-
price contracts have been more popular with customers who stayed with their existing 
supplier. From 2001 to 2004 there has been a reduction in the proportion of customers 
on spot price and one year contracts, and an increase in the proportion on three-year 
contracts. In fact, nearly half of the customers that signed contracts with their existing 
supplier have chosen contracts for three years or longer. The final two columns of 
Table 5a are my own attempt to estimate the overall picture by a weighted average of 
the replies from switchers and non-switchers. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
evidence that customers in houses with electric heating are more active than customers in houses 
without electric heating.  
16 Ofgem (2004 p. 188) has found that relative prices are important determinants of switching, and that 
the largest suppliers particularly British Gas are better able to attract customers, but that “customers in 
all social groups, across all incomes and of all ages are switching supplier at rates at or near the 
national average of 51 per cent in electricity and 41 per cent in gas”. It reports no difference by type of 
housing tenure.  
17 In the UK, comparing prices is not perceived as difficult: 69 % said it was fairly or very easy. The 
view about ease of switching is the same: 83 % found it fairly or very easy. Even 61% of those that 
have never switched thought it would be fairly or very easy. Ofgem 2004, pp. 37-41. 
18 TEMO 2004 slides 32, 33, 44, 45. There is a similar variety of explanations in the UK. 
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Table 5a Nature of contracts signed by customers: survey data 
Type of 
contract 
Those switching supplier % New contract with 
present supplier % 
Estimated total %19 
Date Aug 
2000 
Aug 
2001 
Oct 
2004 
Aug 
2001 
Oct 
2004 
Aug  
2001 
Oct 
2004 
Spot  15 18 13 10 3 13 8 
≤1 year 24 26 26 27 15 27 21 
2 years 15 13 17 21 23 18 20 
≥3 years 10 18 28 29 48 24 37 
Other20 36 25 16 13 11 18 14 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: TEMO 2004 slides 34, 40 
 
Table 5b provides recent data from SCB for the country as a whole, based on usage 
rather than customer numbers. These data may be more accurate than the TEMO 
customer data, but the two data sets are broadly consistent if the TEMO ‘unknown’ 
category is included in the SCB 1 year category. On this basis, it appears that 1 year 
and 3-year contracts presently account for about three quarters of all contracts chosen 
by Swedish residential consumers. 
 
Table 5b Nature of contracts signed by customers: statistics bureau (SCB) data 
Terms of 
supply 
May 2004  May 2005  
 All customers 
% 
Active 
customers % 
All customers 
% 
Active 
customers % 
Standard tariff 56.8 --- 49.6 --- 
Spot price 3.7 8.5 4.0 7.9 
1 year 15.1 35.0 19.9 39.5 
2 years 7.9 18.3 9.8 19.4 
3 years 16.5 38.2 16.7 33.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
2.2 Range of prices on offer in Sweden 
 
Once competitive offers began, many of the retail suppliers responded.  The consumer 
authority maintains a website search organisation for electricity offers.21 This gives 
some indication of the extent of the market and how it has evolved over time.  
 
In June 2003 the website listed 62 offers for a 3-year contract for a 20,000 kWh house 
with electric heating. The highest price (excluding grid charges) was offered by one of 
the Swedish Big Three companies. The saving of the best contract compared to the 
contract of the incumbent (another of the Big Three) was about 5% of total price. The 
                                                 
19 Estimated by weighting the percentages in the previous columns by the reported proportions of 
customers in each category viz 13% switched and 17% new contracts with existing suppliers in August 
2001, 29% and 25% respectively in October 2004. 
20 “Other” is the difference between 100% and the sum of the specified categories. Essentially, these 
are customers who ‘don’t know’ or ‘won’t say’. 
21 www.kopguiden.konsumentverket.se. The organisation provides the site and invites suppliers to 
enter terms; it does not check those terms. 
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main savings were in moving from a Standard tariff to a contract, rather than in 
finding the best contract.22  
 
Table 6 (from another source) shows some tariff and contract prices on offer at that 
time for a medium consumption household. The source contained data for the 20 
largest companies that account for some 80 per cent of electricity supply in Sweden. 
The average energy charge for a 1-year contract was nearly 20 per cent lower than the 
Standard tariff. The average energy charge for a 3-year contract was about 6 per cent 
less than for a 1-year contract. The largest companies had the highest prices.23 This 
situation is perhaps typical of a market recently opened to competition, where new 
entrants undercut incumbents and the latter are initially reluctant or not pressed to 
respond. 
 
Table 6 Energy charges in Sweden (ore/kWh) with effect from 1 August 2003  
(for household consumption 5,000 kWh/yr) 
 
 Standard tariff 1 year contract 3 year contract 
Average 47.11 37.77 35.53 
    
Vattenfall 55.94 40.80 35.80 
Fortum 55.80 40.66 38.66 
Sydkraft 53.30 38.30 37.80 
Plusenergi 41.54 39.80 39.50 
    
Telge Energi 45.02 38.52 36.22 
Elbolaget i Norden 47.88 38.40 35.30 
Malarenergi 40.40 36.60 34.60 
Skelleftea Kraft 41.00 35.12 31.82 
Source: montel powernews, week 24, 2003 
 
However, the situation has since changed. The largest companies began to cut their 
retail prices (while nonetheless increasing their generation margins). This change in 
policy reflected a response to emerging retail competition and also to customer 
dissatisfaction with their high prices, poor customer service (including several weeks 
of outages after big storms), high profits and directors’ bonuses. The quickest way to 
repair their reputation was to cut prices. By March 2005, the Big Three suppliers were 
ranked in the middle of the price range rather than at the top.24 At times they 
reportedly had the lowest prices in the market. 
 
The market has proved remarkably thick, and the range of contracts seems to have 
been expanding. On 12 June 2005 the consumer website listed 392 offers from 71 
                                                 
22 This same has been true of moving from an incumbent to a competing supplier versus moving 
between competing suppliers in the UK, and presumably in other markets too. 
23 The first four companies in Table 7 – the largest suppliers - had energy charges around 5 percent 
above the average. The last four suppliers in Table 3 - the smaller suppliers ranked 8th to 12th in the 
original table –– had charges around 5 per cent lower than the average. 
24 They were listed between 17th and 26th out of 64 offers listed on the consumer website. Spot related 
or variable prices were a little lower than fixed price contracts. The time gap between the two sets of 
observations was 18 months, but prices may have changed sooner than that.   
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suppliers. The range of prices was considerable.25 The most popular contracts were 
for 1,2 and 3 years - the website listed over 60 different offers for each. It had over 40 
offers for spot price contracts (see Table 7). In addition, there were small numbers of 
offers for contracts of 3,6 and 18 months and of 4 and 5 years. These contracts are 
available to all sizes of households. Most involve monthly billing, but many suppliers 
are willing to offer less frequent billing if that is what customers prefer.26   
 
Table 7 Number of contract offers in Swedish electricity market27, June 2005 
Type of 
contract/Size of 
customer 
(kWh/year) 
20,000 kWh 5000 kWh 2000 kWh 
Spot 48 44 42 
3 months 9 8 9 
6 months 5 5 5 
1 year 71 69 69 
18 months 2 2 2 
2 years 67 66 66 
3 years 68 67 67 
4 years 5 5 5 
5 years 4 4 4 
 
There is also variety over time, depending on the season, the pattern of Nordpool 
prices and customer sentiment. Typically a supplier will see an opportunity to match a 
perceived customer preference against a favourable wholesale situation, sign up a 
wholesale contract in order to make a retail offer against it, and close the offer when 
the number of retail customers matches the wholesale contract. This offer might be 
open for only a few weeks.  
 
The following two case studies summarise the experiences and policies of a relatively 
small but very active competitor Telge Energi and the largest incumbent company 
Vattenfall. 
 
2.3 The origin of residential electricity contracts in Sweden: Telge Energi (TE) 
 
Contracts and spot price terms in Sweden originated with Telge Energi (TE), the 
electricity company from Sodertaljie, a municipality just outside Stockholm. The 
municipalities of Sodertaljie and Nykvarn jointly own the company. TE was the first 
competitor in the field and is now the most active residential supplier outside of the 
Big Three suppliers.  
                                                 
25 The lowest offer was 71.4 ore/kWh, for a 3-month contract available to all types of customer. The 
highest offer ranged from 83.1 ore/kWh for a 20,000 kWh/year house with electric heating to 107.7 
ore/kWh for a 2000 kWh/year apartment. (These figures are higher than in Table 6 and elsewhere 
because they are for the total price including network charges, whereas the other figures refer only to 
the energy component.) In March 2005 the margin on spot contracts seemed to be in the range 8.9 to 
14.2 ore/kWh. 
26 For a 3 year contract for a 20,000 kWh house on 11 June 2005, there were 68 different offers 
including all billing possibilities. There were 63 offers for monthly billing, 60 for bi-monthly, 51 for 
quarterly, 7 for 4-monthly, 11 for bi-annually and 6 for annually. It appears that most suppliers offer 
considerable flexibility in billing. 
27 Source: www.konsumentverket.se at 11 June 2005, including all billing options. 
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2.3.1 First steps 
 
Initially, TE had only 1 per cent of the Swedish market and wished to expand in order 
to secure economies from greater size. Its strategy was to aim at households using 
electricity for domestic heating, just over a fifth of all households. Before the 
competitive market opened these consumers were accustomed to uncertain and 
generally rising electricity prices. TE perceived them as wanting both lower and more 
certain prices. Its initial contract offering was a response to this. 
 
In May 1997 TE offered fixed-price fixed-term contracts to its own customers at no 
reduction in prices, and got a very good response. Then it made offers outside its own 
area, of a 2-3 year fixed price contract at a 20% price reduction. There was a very 
good response from customers: 20-30% of electric heating households in Stockholm 
signed up within the first six months. This encouraged TE to offer the same types of 
contract at lower prices in other areas.  
 
Apart from the price difference, fixed-price fixed-term contracts had two advantages 
over the tariff terms offered by the incumbents. First, they were similar to contracts in 
the mortgage market, with which customers would be familiar. Second, before 
profiling was introduced, customers choosing competitive supply had to install hourly 
metering. TE was able to give away the meters for free, with the fixed-price fixed-
term contract recovering the initial metering cost over a predictable period of time. 
 
Other companies followed TE. The incumbent suppliers began to offer fixed-price 
contracts below their standard tariff price but about 2-3 ore/kWh above the level 
offered by TE. Many customers accepted fixed-price contracts with their own 
suppliers rather than switch supplier. This meant that they continued to get a single 
bill whereas if the distribution and supply companies were different they would get 
two bills. They also avoided the inconvenience of changing supplier with its 
possibility of misread, inaccurate or missed bills, which was then a problem. 
 
2.3.2 Spot price terms 
 
In March 1998, about ten months after it had offered fixed-price contracts in 
Stockholm, TE began to offer spot price terms (Nordpool spot price plus 2.9 ore/kWh 
to cover its costs) as part of its offer to provide free meters. On this basis it initially 
required a minimum agreement period of 2 years in order to cover metering costs. TE 
saw spot price as a way of offering innovative new deals and good prices to 
customers. Customers had some concerns that incumbents were trying to lock them 
into long contracts at high prices at a time when spot prices were very low. 
Developments in the electricity market at this time also reflected the recent 
liberalisation of the home mortgage market, where customers were beginning to 
explore new choices of spot versus term rates.  
 
Again, some other suppliers followed suit. In the event - as with mortgages – 
relatively few customers accepted spot price terms. At that time they preferred fixed 
price contracts in the expectation that electricity prices would normally go up each 
year. 
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2.3.3 TE’s evolving customer base 
 
IT systems initially constrained TE’s ability to accommodate new customers to an 
increase of about 10,000 per year. New IT systems removed this constraint, and more 
recently it has been attracting around 20,000 new customers per year. Table 8 sets out 
the evolving nature of its customer base and the choices of its customers as regards 
terms of contract. It now has four times as many customers as when it started 
competing some eight years ago. Only 15 per cent of all its customers are now on 
standard tariff terms.  
 
Table 8 Composition and development of Telge Energi’s customers 
Type of customer:   May 1997 Spring 2003 Winter 2004/5 
Customers within area 
- on Standard tariff   45,000  30,000  25,000 
- on individual agreements  0  15,000  15,000 
Customers outside area   
- on individual agreements  0  95,000  130,000 
Total number of customers  45,000  140,000 170,000 
 
Terms chosen by customers on individual agreements: 
       Spring 2003 Winter 2004/5 
Spot price terms       11,000  13,000 
Fixed price 1-3 year contracts     99,000 132,000 
Total individual agreements    110,000 145,000 
 
The preferences of customers as to duration of contract vary over time. Initially, most 
chose the 1-year contract. However, following the very high spot prices during winter 
2003, most customers chose the 3-year contract. Nordpool prices turned down during 
the last part of 2004, contract prices went down too, consumers began to expect that 
prices would continue to fall during the coming year, and there was increasing 
demand for short (6 months) contracts. 
 
2.3.4 TE’s present policy  
 
TE’s present policy is to be the best supplier for households rather than the cheapest. 
It uses its knowledge to purchase electricity on the best terms and to make new kinds 
of offers that are more attractive to customers without necessarily involving a lower 
price.  TE was among the first to offer six month contracts when Nordpool prices 
began to fall; in fact, between October 2004 and March 2005 half its sales were for 
such contracts. As another example, TE noted that a fixed price contract always 
involved an extra cost but the risk of high spot prices was only significant in the 
winter. Accordingly, in 2004 it introduced a new type of contract called 50-50, 
involving a fixed price during the winter and spot price at other times.  
 
TE either does not wish, or is not able, to offer all types of contract. For example, a 
few companies (including Fortum and Sydkraft) have offered 3 month contracts. TE 
reports no demand for such contracts from its customers, and the set up costs and 
billing times make such a short period less attractive. (Its shortest contract has been 5 
months.) A few companies have offered 4- and 5-year contracts. TE finds it difficult 
to get contracts on Nordpool to back an offer for more than 3 years. 
 14
 
2.3.5 Marketing 
 
TE makes offers to customers through direct mailing in the areas of the Big Three 
companies. In regional areas it supports this with small TV commercials, though 
national advertising is too expensive. About 25 per cent of new customer agreements 
follow directly from such a mailing, about 35 per cent from internet contact, which 
may be a response to a mailing, and about 40 per cent from phone marketing. TE does 
not recommend particular products that it offers, but rather invites potential customers 
to ask others what they are doing. TE’s website in fact indicates the proportions of its 
customers choosing each type of contract at any time.28 
 
2.3.6 Market context 
 
TE’s policy is to continue to grow, and to challenge the larger incumbent 
companies.29 However, growth is difficult because it is not yet the custom in Sweden 
to choose electricity suppliers. There has been little new entry into retailing since 
recent margins have been low. The larger integrated companies are perceived to have 
been increasing their margins in generation and reducing them in retail.30 For TE, the 
small number of active competitors is a problem rather than an advantage.  
 
TE does not wish to integrate backwards into generation. It has tried to encourage a 
more competitive Nordic market. To that end it was instrumental in forming a new 
organisation of Independent Electricity Sales Companies, presently with 10 members, 
to focus more explicitly on retail issues than the existing industry organisation Svensk 
Energi did. 
 
2.4 The largest Swedish electricity supplier: Vattenfall 
 
Vattenfall is 100 per cent state-owned, and the largest of the Big Three companies in 
the Swedish electricity market. It has nearly half the generation output in the country, 
a 13% share of the residential market under its own brand, and a much higher share 
with associates.  
 
2.4.1 Vattenfall’s company strategy 
 
Vattenfall’s business strategy has evolved over time. When the residential market first 
opened, it explored attracting new customers. It concluded that electricity was an 
immature market where households were not yet ready to choose or did not care 
sufficiently about their supplier and the possible cost savings. Its aim then became to 
keep its existing customers rather than to attract new ones. But during 2003 the 
increasing pressure of competition, and substantial media criticism of the high prices 
and poor service offered by the Big Three companies, led it to reassess this strategy. 
                                                 
28 For example, on 10 June 2005 TE’s website (www.telgeenergi.se) reported that 43% of customers 
were choosing a spot price contract, 12% a 6 month contract, 29% a 1 year contract and 8% a 2 year 
contract. The remaining 8% of customers were presumably choosing some other type of contract.  
29 In 2004 TE ran a commercial with the slogan “Beware of the electricity giants”. Its website contrasts 
its own relatively high quality standards with those of the larger companies. 
30 For example, it has been suggested that Vattenfall’s generation margin increased from 10 to 14 
ore/kWh while its retail margin fell from 0.8 to 0.5 ore/kWh, and similarly for Fortum. 
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In early 2004 it decided actively to seek new customers, to position its prices so as to 
achieve this and to avoid negative headlines, and to improve its quality of service. 
 
2.4.2 Vattenfall’s pricing decisions 
 
Before the residential market was opened to competition, Vattenfall changed its 
standard tariff about once a year, an important decision taken just below Board level. 
With increasing competition, it became necessary to change the tariff price more 
frequently and to take this decision at a lower level. Since deregulation in 1999 
Vattenfall has changed its standard tariff 13 times, an average of twice a year. It 
changed the tariff four times in the year to March 2005.31  
 
From 1999 to 2004 Vattenfall’s pricing decisions were taken with a view to 
maintaining the retail margin; the decisions took into account recent and predicted 
Nordpool prices for the next 2-3 months, customer movements between suppliers, 
competitive price levels, and predicted reactions of customer numbers to price 
changes. During this period Vattenfall had one of the highest prices in the industry. 
Other companies tended to look to Vattenfall as the price leader in terms of content 
and timing. They also studied how Vattenfall set its contract prices.32  
 
In Spring 2004 Vattenfall changed its pricing strategy, to take greater account of 
customers’ concerns and competitors’ prices. In 2004-5 it was generally in the low- to 
mid-price range for all products. The other Big Three suppliers Sydkraft and Fortum 
are perceived to have changed strategy too. In consequence, their main competitor TE 
is no longer perceived as having much lower prices overall. TE tends to focus on one 
product at a time and tries to be the cheapest supplier for that specific product, but the 
Big Three are more often than not cheaper than TE on other products. The price 
spread between the Big Three and TE can now sometimes be less than 1 per cent of 
the electricity cost (excluding grid charges and tax) for electrically heated houses, or 
less than half a per cent of the total electricity bill.33  
 
2.4.3 Standard tariff versus contracts 
 
Initially, the company faced a dilemma regarding tariffs versus contracts. On the one 
hand, many existing customers accepted the Standard tariff, which was profitable for 
the company. On the other hand, the company promoted the concept of contracts, and 
                                                 
31 This was facilitated by a change in regulations that enabled incumbent suppliers to advertise tariff 
changes in local papers instead of having to give customers notice by mail. This significantly reduces 
the company’s cost of making tariff changes. 
32 There is a significant volume risk as well as price risk in this market, since customers may use more 
or less energy than forecast or than average. Vattenfall considers that it has good competence here 
whereas some other energy companies did not have. In winter 2002/3 several small companies had 
problems and a few went bankrupt because they had not properly calculated their volume risks. 
33 On 7 March 2005 these four companies were ranked between 17th and 26th out of 64 listed offers for 
a 1 year contract; the spread between their offers was about 1.1% of the electricity cost excluding 
energy tax and grid charges (about 0.7% of the electricity price including energy tax but excluding grid 
charges). By 10 June 2005 they were ranked 13th to 39th out of 68 offers, and the spread had risen to 
about 2% of electricity price including energy tax but excluding grid charges. Of the four companies’ 
offers, TE’s was the second highest on 7 March and the highest on 10 June. 
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wanted its customers to be active and to make a choice of preferred contract, which it 
considered would increase customer satisfaction.34  
 
In the first few years Vattenfall took a rather passive line. The proportion of its 
customers on tariff prices was comparable to the national average, which was around 
70 per cent in 2000 and 2001 and gradually falling thereafter. In late 2003, however, 
Vattenfall decided to reduce its tariff group as much and as soon as possible; it 
committed publicly to eliminating the tariff in due course. Whereas the national 
average in March 2005 was down to about 50 per cent tariff customers (see Table 3 
above), Vattenfall’s proportion of tariff customers was down to about 28 per cent, 
with a corresponding increase to over 70 per cent in the proportion of its customers on 
contract.35 
 
2.4.4 Marketing and innovation at Vattenfall 
 
Vattenfall began to reorient its approach in 2002, with its project “Number One for 
the Customer” whereby “a fresh approach to our customers means electricity 
consumption on the customer’s terms”. This included offering new electricity price 
products in stages during 2003.  One of these products launched in autumn 2003 was 
the ‘Convenient electricity price’. This proved very popular with customers but was 
eventually withdrawn.36  
 
Another new product is the Right to Change contract. A customer on a 3-year fixed 
price contract may purchase the right to change at any time to the present price for a 
3-year contract. This is potentially attractive in a volatile market where market prices 
may turn down after the initial contract is signed. This product is normally priced at 
between 70 and 600 kronor per year, depending on present and expected Pool prices 
and the customer’s consumption. Vattenfall is the only company offering this option 
at present. It proved of interest to customers when 3-year contracts were popular in 
mid-2003 since it gave customers an option to lower their energy costs if prices went 
down without having to choose the volatile spot price.  
 
As part of its policy to position itself more competitively, Vattenfall’s purchasing 
strategy is now more closely tailored to its potential contract sales.37 It has begun to 
                                                 
34 It cites survey evidence that customers who choose new suppliers are more satisfied than those who 
stay with old and existing ones, and that active customers are happier than passive ones. The company 
concluded that customers would stay longer if it let them decide the terms of their contracts, rather than 
just accepting what the company decided. 
35 Switching many tens of thousands of tariff customers per year to a fixed price contract is a 
substantial logistical exercise. There may be an irreducible minimum of tariff customers insofar as all 
customers who move into a new area - about 10 per cent of the total per year - get the tariff price 
automatically until they choose an alternative. 
36 This product guaranteed customers electricity for a given price per month independent of usage (like 
Powergen’s Staywarm product in the UK). Several thousand customers signed up for it in the limited 
time that it was available. However, there were objections that it gave no incentive to save energy, even 
though it was targeted specifically at small consumers who could only save electricity by turning off 
lights or the refrigerator. In addition, there was a regulatory concern that low-volume customers would 
have to pay for high-volume customers, even though it was offered in three price-volume ranges and 
only for below-5000 kWh/year customers. Despite the popularity of the product with customers, the 
company decided that it could not survive the public debate. 
37 For the residential sector, Vattenfall’s practice is to buy electricity in advance on the basis of a sales 
forecast for a specified number of customers. It then offers a fixed price contract for about two weeks 
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offer rebates and special promotions in some cases.38  It is also reviewing its 
marketing strategy, which has hitherto focused mainly on telemarketing. 
 
2.4.5 Spot price contracts 
 
Vattenfall offers a spot price contract with a small fixed margin that is revised from 
time to time. Initially, the company did not actively promote this product because spot 
price is volatile and therefore not necessarily suitable for most domestic customers.39 
It was also difficult to discuss ‘risks’ with customers, and the company did not want 
to focus on the negative aspects of deregulation at that stage. Only a very small 
proportion of its customers chose a spot price contract. Vattenfall continued to offer 
the product because its philosophy is to be a full service company and to meet all 
customer needs in an efficient way. If Nordpool prices had been less volatile, the 
company would have promoted spot price more.  
 
In the event, the proportion of Vattenfall’s customers on spot price has now increased 
to about 12 per cent of all customers, which is somewhat above the national average 
of 4 per cent (Table 5b above). Vattenfall is also one of only two suppliers in Sweden 
to introduce a capped spot price product. This provides that, in return for a fixed 
annual (insurance) premium, the customer pays the spot price up to a certain 
predetermined level, and the cap price if the spot price exceeds that level.   
 
2.4.6 Quality of service 
 
Vattenfall has been concerned to avoid bad publicity following substantial media 
criticism for high prices and poor quality of service. Its own surveys show that its 
customers think it has improved now. It has established its own customer service 
index, which stood at 58 in the past and by early 2005 was up to 63. This is still not 
enough, and the company aims to improve still further over the next few years. 
 
To this end, Vattenfall’s retail and service outlets now have the longest opening hours 
and shortest queue times in the sector. It has also introduced some new customer 
service assurances, such as its ‘switch supplier guarantee’, whereby if Vattenfall 
delays a customer transfer on its own grid it will pay 300 kronor compensation (about 
US$40). It has also introduced its ‘one year guarantee’ never to charge any customer 
for any unbilled consumption beyond one year regardless of whose fault it was. 
 
Some UK companies have introduced new IT systems to overcome inflexibilities in 
their legacy systems. In contrast, Vattenfall has found that its old systems were too 
flexible, leading to many data quality errors that were expensive to correct. It is in the 
                                                                                                                                            
at a time. It has a weekly check on its forecasts, and reviews its prices and products twice a month. The 
required two week ‘cooling off’ period at first seemed to present a problem, since “two weeks is an 
eternity in hedging terms”. (Indicative offers to larger customers may be held open for only a matter of 
minutes.) In practice, however, few residential customers invoke the cooling-off provision. 
 38 These promotions have included waiving the fixed annual cost on a contract, rebating the kWh price, 
a discount on telecommunications products, and free access to other products for which a fee is 
normally charged, such as the Right to Change contract.  
39 Household customers, especially those with electric central heating, are very vulnerable to spot 
prices. The average annual consumption per household is 7-8000 kWh, more than twice that in the UK, 
and there is greater vulnerability to climatic (hydro) conditions. 
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middle of introducing a new billing system intended to simplify the billing process 
and reduce its costs. 
 
III THE RETAIL ELECTRICITY MARKET IN NORWAY 
 
Norway is a smaller market than Sweden, and characterised by greater dominance by 
a state-owned company. Nevertheless, there is a remarkably active retail market, 
particularly with respect to spot price-related contracts. 
 
3.1 Market shares in Norway 
 
On the face of it, the Norwegian generation market is moderately concentrated. 
Statkraft presently accounts for 29 per cent of the generation market, the largest three 
generators for 41 per cent and the largest six for 58 per cent.40 However, there is a 
remarkable degree of cross-ownership between Statkraft and other large generators. 
Companies associated in some way with Statkraft or its owner the Norwegian state 
account for about half the generation market. The largest three independent groups of 
generators seem to have about 57 per cent of the market, and the largest six about 60 
per cent. 
 
At the retail level, there appears to be active competition for residential customers, 
although concentration among suppliers has increased. From 1997 to 2003 the three 
largest suppliers increased their total market share from 37.2 to 56.2 per cent,41 
presumably mostly from merger rather than customers switching supplier. Even so, 
the residential sector is much less concentrated than the UK. 
 
3.2 Switching rate in Norway 
 
The number of residential customers with suppliers other than their local incumbent 
has steadily increased over time. In the largest 27 grid areas the proportion of 
household consumers with another supplier has increased from 5 per cent in 1999 to 
23.5 per cent at end 2004. The proportion varies across Norway: in many grid areas 
the proportion is under 10 percent but in two areas it is over 50 per cent.  
 
Moreover, the rate of switching per quarter has also increased over time, at least until 
mid-2004. The switching rate seems to be related to tariff increases: it reached a peak 
in winter 2002/3 when standard tariff rates increased sharply, reflecting the Nordpool 
price spike. There were smaller peaks in switching in the previous two winters, when 
prices tended to be higher. 
 
In most grid areas more than 30 suppliers are active, and in some areas up to 100 
suppliers are. This is not to say that all these suppliers secure a large market share. In 
2004, NVE identified the top 5 suppliers in each of the main grid areas. They 
                                                 
40 Personal communication, NVE, 17 June 2005. The shares of the largest companies seem to have 
been declining recently. In 2001, Statkraft had 37 per cent of the generation market, and a large number 
of other generators had up to 8 per cent each. The largest three generators had about 53 per cent of the 
market and the largest six about 72 per cent. A Powerful Competition Policy, Report from the Nordic 
competition authorities, Copenhagen, Oslo, Stockholm, 20 June 2003, section 3.4.1, pp. 48-50. 
41 This and much following information from The Norwegian End-User Market, Lars Olav Fosse, 
Advisor, Office of Electricity Market, NVE, slide presentation March 2005 and subsequent discussion.  
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accounted for about 94 per cent of the customers in each area. The aggregate market 
share of the remaining suppliers in each area averaged only around 6 per cent.  
 
Of the 130 suppliers to households, about 30 are considered to compete nationally. In 
fact, the NVE exercise just mentioned seemed to identify three main types of supplier. 
25 suppliers were in the top 5 in only one area, presumably their own area, and did 
not compete effectively elsewhere. 11 suppliers were in the top 5 in 2 to 5 areas, 
presumably including their own, so evidently competed quite actively in 1 to 4 other 
areas, perhaps locally. Finally, 4 suppliers were in the top 5 in 11 or more areas - 
these seem to be the truly national and effective competitors. It thus seems that about 
15 suppliers constitute the main competition to the incumbent suppliers. But even this 
seems a relatively healthy number compared to some other markets. 
 
3.3 Tariffs, contracts and spot prices in Norway 
 
Traditionally, incumbent suppliers set a standard variable tariff to the customers in 
their area, which could be changed at relatively short notice (now 14 days). Over 
time, a variety of alternative terms has been offered. The proportions of households 
choosing each alternative has fluctuated over time but has generally increased. Figure 
2 shows that about 20 per cent of Norwegian households are now on fixed price 
contracts.42 No less than 15.9 per cent are on electricity contracts tied directly to spot 
price. There are several variants of these, including optional caps on the maximum 
price payable at any time.43 The proportion of Norwegian households on standard 
variable tariffs is now down to 64.7 per cent.44   
 
In Norway, residential competition reportedly started with competitors offering a 
‘floating rate’ directly related to the spot price, whereas in Sweden the first 
competitive offering was a fixed price. There is speculation why the percentage of 
customers choosing spot price contracts should be higher in Norway (now about 16%) 
than in Sweden (now about 4%). It is said that Swedes are more risk-averse by 
temperament and tend to choose fixed interest loans, whereas Norwegians dislike 
paying a risk premium for fixed price contracts and prefer floating rates – for 
example, for mortgages. It is also said that, historically, Norway has been more 
exposed to Pool price variations because of its greater dependence on the weather for 
availability of hydro-electricity, hence there is a greater tolerance of electricity price 
fluctuations there.45 
 
                                                 
42 10.7 per cent are on 1-year contracts and 8.7 per cent on other fixed price contracts, thought to be 
mainly 3-year contracts. 
43 There is no standard prescribed way of calculating spot-related tariffs, so at times it has been 
profitable to switch from one spot-related tariff to another, depending on movements in Pool prices. 
44 Statistics Norway, Table 3 Range of electricity prices in end-user market and distribution of sold 
quantity in the sample. http://www.ssb.no/en/elkraftpris/. These data are based on returns from a 
sample of 55 electricity suppliers for one week in the middle of each quarter, covering about 16 per 
cent of the suppliers and 60 per cent of the quantity supplied. 
45 As noted earlier, the dominance of hydro electricity in Norway means that there are bigger swings in 
availability and price on a seasonal basis than in a more balanced system such as Sweden or a 
predominantly thermal system such as the UK. By the same token there is less variability on an hourly 
basis because all hydro plants have about the same (opportunity) cost in each hour. Some suggest that 
this range of variability makes spot price contracts more acceptable in Norway, less acceptable in 
Sweden, and not at all in the UK. 
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Figure 2 Proportions of Norwegian households choosing different electricity contracts 
 
Source: Statistics Norway 
 
Another factor seems to be that the standard variable tariffs in Norway have become 
so variable, and so linked to movements in spot price albeit with a lag, that the 
concept of explicit spot price contracts is not as novel as it appears in Sweden. For 
example, whereas Vattenfall in Sweden has changed its tariffs twice a year since 1999 
(section 2.4.2 above), the main suppliers in Norway have been changing their variable 
tariffs at least once a month on average since 2001, to reflect changes in pool price.46 
 
The standard variable tariff has thus become a means of competing in Norway, or at 
least this tariff has to respond to competitive offers. Figure 3 shows that prices of 
variable tariffs and the various forms of contract now seem to move broadly together, 
in line with spot price. Variable tariffs tend to be a little above the price of spot price 
contracts, and were notably so in the exceptional winter of 2002/3. For the first few 
years after the residential market was opened, fixed price contracts were generally 
more expensive than both these options. That is, customers paid a premium for 
certainty, and a higher premium for 3 years’ certainty rather than 1 year.47 Since the 
winter of 2002/3, however, fixed price contracts have often been less expensive than 
variable tariffs and spot price contracts, and 3 year contracts have been less expensive 
than 1 year contracts. The observations for part of 2004 and especially for first quarter 
2005 suggest that the earlier relationship may now be re-establishing itself.48  
  
3.4 Relative prices by different suppliers in Norway 
 
There are some concerns that competition is not yet fully effective in Norway. Table 9 
shows that in 2004 the cheapest suppliers were on average about 3 per cent lower than 
                                                 
46 On average, the dominant suppliers in the largest grid areas changed their prices in 27.8 per cent of 
weeks between week 27 2001 and week 48 2003, and 27.3 per cent of weeks between week 1 2004 and 
week 12 2005. Lars Olav Fosse, NVE, communication of 9 March 2005.  
47 This is the opposite of the case in Sweden (see above) where fixed price contracts were initially 
offered at a lower price than the variable tariffs. 
48 Note also that Table 9 below suggests that in 2004 variable tariffs were at a premium of about 3 to 6 
per cent above spot price terms, and one year contracts about 4 to 5 per cent above variable tariffs. 
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the largest household suppliers on spot-price related terms and about 7 per cent lower 
on variable tariffs and one year contracts.49 Whether these various differences are a 
sign of competition or the lack of it is perhaps debateable, but they at least do seem to 
indicate a competitive process in action. 
 
Table 9 Electricity costs per year for 20,000 kWh/year household in Norway 
Type of supplier Average 5 largest suppliers Average 5 cheapest suppliers 
Type of terms Ore/year Normalised Ore/year Normalised 
Standard 
variable tariff 
7052 109.4 6639 103.0 
1 year fixed 
price contract 
7375 114.4 6895 106.9 
Spot price with 
mark-up 
6651 103.2 6447 100.0 
Source: Fosse, Norwegian End-User Market. Largest suppliers: Hafslund ASA, Fjordkraft AS, LOS 
AS, Lyse AS and Eidsevia Energi Marked AS. Cheapest suppliers: the 5 nation-wide suppliers with 
lowest average price on standard variable tariffs in 2004. All terms refer to major grid areas. 
 
Figure 3 Household electricity prices in Norway 1998-2005, by contract type 
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Source: Statistics Norway 
 
 
                                                 
49 There were naturally variations within each group. Among the 5 cheapest suppliers, the lowest price 
was 1 to 2 per cent lower than the average on all three types of contract. Among the 5 largest suppliers, 
the highest price was about 2 per cent higher than the average on spot price terms, but some 7 to 8 per 
cent higher than the average on variable tariffs and 1 year contracts. 
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IV THE RETAIL ELECTRICITY MARKET IN FINLAND 
 
4.1 Background and market structure in Finland 
 
Retail competition has not yet developed as much in Finland as in Sweden or even 
Norway, and there have been concerns about the strength of competition there.50 
Nonetheless there are some interesting and promising developments.51 
 
The Finnish electricity sector is diverse, with 91 distribution grid operators (about 
20% municipal, 30% private, 50% mixed) and about 70 retail suppliers. The latter are 
mostly associated with distribution operators and tend to focus on the customers in 
their own regional areas. As yet, the market is very disaggregated. As from 1 January 
2007, the most strict legal separation of supply and distribution businesses is required 
for companies with more than 100,000 customers (about 3 per cent of the market), but 
only six grid operators meet this condition.52   
 
Incumbent suppliers are required to set Standard Variable Tariffs (‘list prices’) for 
customers in their areas. The restrictions on changes in standard tariff prices are more 
severe in Finland than in Norway and Sweden.53 However, all suppliers are allowed to 
offer any price to any customer (in their own area or elsewhere), and on request are 
also allowed to match the price offered by any competitor.  
 
The top three suppliers have about one third of the total retail market between them, 
net of the usage of the largest industrial users (forestry) that buy direct from the 
wholesale market. Of the 70 retailers, about 50 are now willing to offer terms outside 
their own area.  
 
4.2 Concerns about the slow growth of retail competition in Finland 
 
The proportion of residential customers switching supplier has been low, around 5 per 
cent in 2001/2. This has been a matter of comment. In partial explanation, the 
switching process is a more restrictive than in Sweden and Norway.54 But it seems 
                                                 
50 E.g. Lewis et al 2004. 
51 Sources: Annual Report of Energy Market Authority (henceforth EMV) 2003, 2004; The Finnish 
Retail Electricity Market, slide presentation Antti Paananen, EMV, 8 March 2005; Lewis et al 2004. 
52 These 6 grid operators account for 49% of the customers. There are increasingly less onerous 
conditions for 50,000 – 100,000 customers (9 operators, 22% of customers), under 50,000 customers 
but demand over 200 GWh/year (17 operators, 16% of customers) and demand under 200 GWh/year 
(59 operators, 16% of customers). The relevant amendment to the Electricity Market Act came into 
force on December 27th, 2004. Source: EMV. 
53 “Norwegian and Swedish suppliers can change their [tariff] prices with just two weeks notice 
whereas in Finland the minimum notice period is four weeks. In Finland, suppliers need to inform 
customers in person (through letter or customer magazine etc.), whereas in Norway and Sweden even 
notices in newspapers are normally sufficient. [In Norway, customers must be informed directly if the 
price change is more than 2.5 ore/kWh (approximately 10% of a typical residential electricity bill, 
power only).]” Lewis et al 2004, p. 99. 
54 “In Norway, customers can effectively switch supplier (without extra meter reading fees) as often as 
they wish [fn: in which case they need to self-read and report their meter level] and the switching 
process must not take any longer than three weeks. In Sweden, customers can also switch away from an 
incumbent supplier (without extra meter reading fees) whenever they wish (but can only change to a 
fixed-term or spot price tariff) and the process of switching should take not more than one month. In 
Finland, customers can only switch once per year (without extra meter reading fees) [fn: in Sweden and 
Finland customers can switch supplier (without extra metering fees) if their incumbent electricity 
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unlikely that this would significantly restrict the number of first-time switchers. More 
general concerns about the extent of competitiveness in the Finnish retail electricity 
market have been the apparent lack of sustained interest in competing on the part of 
retailers themselves, and the apparently limited relationship between wholesale and 
retail prices. 
 
When the residential market opened in 1998, many suppliers introduced a price cut of 
around 15 per cent to their own customers, so there was less headroom for 
competitive suppliers. Incumbent suppliers have reportedly been willing to match 
competitors’ offers to their customers rather than see them leave.55 Pool prices then 
increased but list prices lagged behind. In early 2004 it was estimated that retail sales 
had been loss-making for several years.56 In response to the low prospective return, 
and the low switching rates, retailers cut back on their marketing activities. Some 
suggest they largely abandoned retail competition.57 
 
Figure 4 shows that list prices have traditionally been rather stable, and unresponsive 
to NordPool price. Many suppliers have their own generation plant (distribution 
utilities account for some 20 per cent of generation) and are therefore less dependent 
on Pool prices than pure retailers. The municipalities are said to like a stable income. 
When the Pool price shot up in winter 2002/3, list prices lagged behind Pool prices, 
and for a time contract offer prices exceeded list prices. Many retailers were unwilling 
to make offers beyond their statutory obligations to customers within their areas.  
 
Figure 4 List prices, offer prices and spot prices in Finland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
supplier raises its price for reasons other than legal compliance] but may switch to a variable, fixed-
term or spot tariff [with the same supplier], and there is no stated maximum process time. According to 
reports from some Finnish suppliers the whole process can consequently sometimes be a protracted 
affair fraught with delaying tactics imposed by incumbent suppliers.” Lewis et al 2004, p. 99. 
55 In a survey, about 7 per cent of residential customers stated that their loyalty was influenced by 
having negotiated such a deal. Lewis et al. 2004, p. 37. 
56 EMV 2003, p. 31. 
57 “Evidence furthermore suggests that because of the risks associated with buying and selling 
electricity, because of poor or negative past financial results (in many cases) and because few 
residential customers have decided to change supplier in order to take advantage of price differentials, 
Finnish electricity suppliers in particular have generally given up with the idea of competition, at least 
concerning residential customers (partly due to customer apathy). Aspirations of growth through 
customer acquisition have consequently generally given way to the attainment of relationship value and 
profit through maximising prices.” Lewis et al 2004 p. 91. 
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Source: EMV 
 
Subsequently, list prices increased and Pool prices declined. Recently, list prices have 
fallen slightly, but some question whether they have fallen sufficiently to match the 
Pool price decline.58  
 
4.3 Recent developments in Finland 
 
If indeed retail sales were loss-making, then it is understandable if retailers were 
losing interest in competing, and that a higher margin is now establishing itself. This 
should rekindle interest in competition, and indeed there seems to be some evidence 
of this. It is reported that suppliers have become more advanced with their risk 
management and pricing.59 Figure 4 suggests that there is now a closer relationship 
between list prices, contract prices and Pool price. The next two case studies suggest 
that different kinds of suppliers are increasingly interested and prepared to compete, 
and are now offering a variety of different contract forms. These are evidently of 
growing appeal to customers, and perhaps 20 per cent of customers have now chosen 
contracts of one to two years duration.60 The proportion of customers that have 
switched supplier increased to about 11 per cent in 2004. 
 
There are no formal barriers to entry in Finland – for example, no licence is required 
for generation, trading or retail supply, so even a private individual could become a 
retail supplier.61 Some large foreign players (Vattenfall and E.On) have entered by 
acquiring existing Finnish businesses. There has been a small amount of completely 
new entry into retail. Housing and other associations have been active in affinity 
arrangements. Halpa Halli, a chain of department stores, started to sell electricity 
about three years ago. Station 1, owned by a group of gas stations, sells via the 
internet. Turku Energia is a particularly innovative and competitive city utility. These 
last two suppliers offer spot-related pricing to residential customers.62 The role of 
suppliers may also be evolving in the face of increasing market volatility.63 
 
                                                 
58 Lewis et al 2004. There is also some concern about the lack of transparency of price matching and 
the varying tax and financial policies of the municipalities. 
59 Lewis et al 2004, p. 90. 
60 “It is estimated that around 80 per cent of residential customers in Finland currently receive standard 
consumer prices from incumbent suppliers.” Lewis et al.  2004, p. 36. Contracts over 2 years are not 
allowed in Finland, and only a very few customers  have chosen spot price terms. 
61 An entrant needs to make arrangements with the local distribution grid operator, which is responsible 
for metering and also for energy balancing in its own area. This does not seem to have been 
problematic. 
62 Spot pricing was introduced at an unfortunate time in Finland, just before the spot price shot up in 
winter 2002/3, but these suppliers evidently believe there is still some interest. 
63 “Electricity suppliers are increasingly being seen and appreciated for being advisors and ‘middle 
men’ as opposed to sellers. Their skill and contacts in risk and portfolio management, as well as their 
overall expertise in energy and energy market issues, are apparently appreciated more and more by 
I&C customers.” Lewis et al 2004, p. 38. 
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4.4 The development of regulation in Finland 
 
There have been concerns about the availability of information and the limited role of 
regulation.64 The Energy Market Authority was active in a number of areas in 2003-4, 
notably with the introduction of emissions trading activities and the ex ante regulation 
of distribution charges. It has now expressed some concern about the slow 
development of retail competition, and has taken various steps to facilitate the market. 
This includes explaining how to get a competitive quotation 65 and providing a better 
website for customers to compare prices.66 
 
4.5 A large new entrant: Vattenfall in Finland 
 
Vattenfall established an office in Finland in 1994, bought its first Finnish companies 
in 1995 when the market was opening, and has acquired further companies over the 
period to 2000. It is now one of the four largest electricity companies in Finland (the 
others being Fortum, Helsinki Energy and E.On). Vattenfall has chosen to operate its 
distribution network and sales operations in Finland as separate companies, going 
beyond the present separations requirements. It now has 325,000 households (strictly, 
points of delivery) in its territory. 
 
When the residential market opened in 1998, wholesale and Nordpool prices were 
falling to reflect favourable water supply, and there was the pressure of impending 
retail competition. Vattenfall lowered its tariff prices by about 20 per cent. It also 
launched what was then a new type of contract, with a fixed price for a fixed 2-year 
term, at a price about 10 per cent lower than the tariff price. It sent a personal offer to 
every existing Vattenfall customer (which caused some problems with backoffice 
work and customer telephone calls) and 30 per cent of its customers opted for the 
fixed term contract. 
 
At the same time Vattenfall was active in marketing to new customers. However, 
customers were not very willing to change supplier, a new concept at that time. This 
meant that the cost of customer acquisition was high. TV and direct mail had a low hit 
                                                 
64 Consumer price information websites in Finland are said to be less informative than those in Norway 
and Sweden. Moreover, “The Finnish regulator is clearly the least resourced regulator amongst the 
three [Nordic] markets. Regardless of its limited mandates, its ability to supervise activities in the 
electricity supply market is extremely limited regarding, for instance, market behaviour-tracking and 
customer behaviour.” Lewis et al 2004, pp. 93-4, 99-100.  
65 “In order to encourage consumers, the Energy Market Authority published a brochure on how to 
make electricity companies compete in autumn 2004. The Electricity Market Authority wants to correct 
the idea prevailing among consumers, according to which it is complicated and almost useless for the 
consumer to invite electricity tenders. The brochure ‘Buy affordable electricity by inviting tenders’ 
reveals how electricity tenders can be invited smoothly and swiftly in practice and how the tenders 
should be compared with each other.” EMV Annual Report 2004, p. 14. 
66 “There are price-related commercial services available on the market. Although they have helped to 
make the price data available to consumers, they have many significant defects. The prices are not 
always current prices, because only a few electricity retailers make their prices available to the service 
providers. In addition, some services are subject to a charge that either the consumer or the seller has to 
pay, and some services may be complicated to use or are not well-known and therefore have a small 
number of users. … The situation requires the creation of an easy and uncomplicated system by which 
electricity users, especially household consumers, can reliably check the best electricity offers. … The 
Electricity Market Authority is designing a system for its web site which will enable electricity users to 
obtain real-time information on prices swiftly from one place.” EMV Annual Report 2004, p. 14. 
 26
rate; telemarketing would have been more effective but also more expensive. 
Vattenfall decided to build partnerships to attract new customers, including with the 
co-operative S-Group67, the Federation of Finnish Enterprises, the Federation of 
Finnish Farmers, etc. S-Group uses bonus cards yielding a discount on purchases 
(normally up to 5 per cent), which is now available on electricity too. Some of these 
partnerships were exclusive, others were not. In general partnerships proved most 
cost-effective as regards marketing and loyalty, and Vattenfall is foremost in this 
approach.  
 
Vattenfall offers a variety of different price levels and discounts, as many as five in 
some cases. It is sometimes the most competitive on price but not always, particularly 
when Nordpool market prices are high. It buys on Nordpool and prices its products 
accordingly. Some other companies have their own generation, and price on the basis 
of their own costs rather than Nordpool prices. Some of these other companies are 
also able to absorb losses in other activities and act uncommercially, so that clear 
unbundling is important if the competitive market is to develop.  
 
In the early days, the company encountered various problems with retail competition. 
Many suppliers were not ready for the competitive market. Processes for customer 
transfer were not yet well established, either by grid companies or by suppliers. Some 
existing suppliers and network operators resisted customer transfers (e.g. by levying 
an additional fee for meter reading or higher distribution charges on customers that 
changed supplier). Service levels in many companies were poor. But most of these 
problems are now largely resolved. 
 
Vattenfall now offers fixed price 2 year contracts outside and within its area, plus a 
variable tariff within-area. In the future it sees only fixed term contracts, and not 
tariffs. Such contracts make it easier to purchase electricity, and contract customers 
are more loyal. At present only a small percentage of Vattenfall’s customers are from 
outside its area, but nearly half of its customers are on contracts. It has not offered a 
1-year contract, since contract renewal is costly for company and customer. It is 
precluded by the regulations from offering a 3-year contract, but in any case does not 
wish to do so. It has considered offering spot price terms, but surveys show that 
residential customers are not interested to take the full spot price risk. In the event of 
high spot prices they might leave to sign a fixed price contract with another supplier. 
However, the company is ready to launch a spot-price product if market sentiment 
changes. 
 
Over time, Vattenfall has made many changes within the organisation to facilitate its 
efficient operation. For example, it outsourced its network construction to Empower 
in 2001 and merged its network businesses into one company Vattenfall Verkko in 
2002.  It centralised all customer data within one system, and is implementing a new 
SAP system during 2005. It is working with other companies to send a single bill to 
customers. In 2005 it began large-scale installations of remote readable meters, using 
the same GSM technology as in mobile phones, and plans to change all its meters 
within 2 ½ years. It calculates that the savings on meter-reading costs will match the 
investment costs.  
                                                 
67 S-Group is a co-operative store present in many businesses and the second largest entity in the daily 
consumer goods business. 
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4.6 A municipal incumbent: Helsinki Energy 
 
Helsinki Energy (HE) was one of the first electricity companies in Finland. It is now 
owned by the city of Helsinki. Unlike some other electricity companies, it actively 
prepared for market opening, and considered how it could compete most effectively. 
It concluded that simply defending its own customer base was inadequate and 
expensive, and that it should aim to sell its product outside of Helsinki. 
 
Because of the low temperatures, district heating is important in Finland. The co-
generation system makes it simple to produce electricity as well as heat. Before 1995 
any electricity surpluses were sold on the wholesale market, although the price was 
not attractive. HE’s present co-generation system can provide about twice as much 
electricity as needed for all those customers in the city of Helsinki, and the surplus 
can now be sold on the market and to other end-users. 
 
In order to engender trust on the part of its customers, HE’s policy is not to sell 
electricity to new (outside) customers at a lower price than it sells to its own 
customers in Helsinki. Normally it does not sell to them at a higher price either, 
although in the exceptional winter 2002/3 it had to do so, to avoid raising prices to its 
own customers. Many retailers even stopped making offers to new customers. 
 
HE was never subsidised and always made a profit. Before the market opened, it set 
its prices with a view to covering its power plant investment costs over a 20 year 
horizon. Calculating prices was relatively straightforward. Now this is more difficult, 
and plans may need to be changed from hour to hour. The costs of investment have to 
be recouped in periods when prices are high enough to allow this – that is, when 
demand is high in relation to the electricity capacity available - rather than on an even 
basis in each year. Cost-based pricing has been changed to market-based pricing 
driven by the NordPool spot and forwards markets. 
 
The company is now reorganised into separate functions (network distribution, sales 
and production). The sales department is responsible for buying and selling on the 
electricity markets - two different processes – so as to be able to offer customers 
competitive price levels. 
 
HE’s philosophy is to provide transparent pricing for large customers, so that they can 
trust the company. In 2002 it introduced its Dynamic Electricity contract involving a 
combination of spot purchasing and Nordpool forwards contracts, in the light of 
various identified scenarios and risks.68  
 
At the residential level, HE reduced its variable tariff by 29 per cent when the market 
opened in 1998, to establish good relations with its customers. Low wholesale market 
prices and HE’s efficiency allowed it to keep its retail prices low and stable until 
2001. Rising wholesale prices, particularly in winter 2002/3, necessitated some price 
increases, and improved purchasing efficiency by other companies has meant that 
                                                 
68 “Customers are more willing than before to sign electricity contracts of a long duration, and their 
need can be met, because the Dynamic Electricity contract makes it possible to fix the electricity price 
in stages for as many as three years after the signing of the contract.” Annual Report 2003, Helsinki 
Energy, p. 6. 
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HE’s advantage has narrowed. Nonetheless, it has attracted new customers and lost 
quite few. It expects more switching in future. 
 
Initially, HE concentrated on its variable tariff and (exceptionally among competitive 
suppliers) did not offer contracts. However, it now sees the market changing: there is 
greater uncertainty about wholesale prices and new costs to consider (such as CO2). It 
has concluded that customers will come to appreciate contracts, and it has therefore 
decided to make them available. HE will use hedging products to minimise the risks 
for households too (though not all risks can be offset, such as changing load profiles 
and abnormal temperatures). As it indicated last year, the intention was to offer 1- and 
2-year contracts in Spring 2005 and those products are already available for HE’s own 
customers.  
 
V CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Nordic electricity markets are of particular interest with respect to the 
development of retail competition at residential level. In some ways the structure of 
the market is not promising. For example, a few vertically integrated players tend to 
dominate in each national market, but to some extent the ability to trade between 
these national markets offsets this. The municipal ownership of most distribution and 
retail entities may reduce their ability and incentive to compete for customers, but this 
is perhaps offset by the sheer quantity of players, the consequent thickness of the 
wholesale markets, and the greater likelihood that at least some of them will be 
willing and able to participate in the retail markets. Importantly, too, the extent of 
municipal and state ownership may explain the absence of price controls or other 
restrictions on the final retail price. This has enabled retail competition to flourish in 
the Nordic residential electricity markets, which has not be the case in all other such 
markets. 
 
A significant proportion of residential customers - ranging from 11 to 29 per cent - 
has switched away from incumbent suppliers. Of particular interest is the ever-
increasing richness of contractual forms emerging. Between 20 and 50 per cent of 
residential customers have actively turned away from the traditional tariff that is 
variable at the supplier’s discretion. These customers have chosen either a fixed price 
contract for between 3 months and 5 years (mostly 1,2 or 3 years), or a spot-price 
contract directly related to the NordPool spot market price. Table 10 summarises the 
present situation. 
 
 
Table 10 International comparison of residential contract types 
Country Sweden Norway Finland UK 
Switched supplier (%) 29 24 11 42 
     
Variable tariff (%) 50 65 80 >60 
Variable tariff with cap (%) 0 0 0 30 
     
≤1-year fixed price contract (%) 19 11 
2-year fixed price contract (%) 10 20 
≥3-year fixed price contract (%) 17 9 0 
<10 
Spot-related contract (%) 4 16 ~ 0 0 
 29
     
Total (%) 100 100 100 100 
Source: present text for Nordic countries, Littlechild (2005b) for UK. 
 
For comparison, the final column of Table 10 summarises experience in the UK. The 
proportion of switching is much higher there, at over 40 per cent, though it has not 
been increasing much recently.69 In contrast, the ‘28 day rule’, which requires that all 
residential customers be able to change supplier at 28 days’ notice, seems to have 
discouraged the provision of fixed-term contracts. In the last two years, following 
hitherto unusual price increases, the major suppliers have responded to customer 
concerns in two ways. Four suppliers have on a few occasions offered a fixed price 
for a fixed period in return for an additional charge. At any time at most one such 
option has been available from each company. This option is comparable to a contract 
offered in the Nordic countries except that customers are able to leave at 28 days’ 
notice, sometimes with a cancellation fee. My estimate is that under 10 per cent of all 
residential customers have actively chosen one of these options. The other two major 
suppliers have promised not to increase their variable tariff price until January 2006, 
so that all their customers automatically have a temporary tariff cap without having 
chosen or paid for it. The combined residential market share of these two suppliers is 
presently about 30 per cent.  
 
The Nordic markets thus have much greater variety of contract forms than the UK. In 
addition, a greater proportion of customers (20 to 50 per cent compared to under 10 
per cent) has exercised choice in this respect.   
 
Nordic experience suggests a number of conclusions. As regards consumer 
preferences, a) a significant proportion of residential customers prefer such contracts 
rather than the traditional variable tariff; b) the proportion of such customers has 
increased over time; c) at any one time these customers have different preferences one 
from another; and d) customers’ preferences seem to evolve over time in response to 
experience. For example, some customers seem to assume that future spot prices will 
follow the pattern of recent past prices, and they choose long, short or spot contracts 
accordingly. Customers seem to honour these contracts: there is no suggestion that 
they renege on long-term contracts when market prices change. 
 
As regards the behaviour of suppliers, a) suppliers differ significantly in their 
willingness and ability to compete in this way; b) this willingness and ability tends to 
increase over time; c) competition tends to be initiated by a few smaller players, who 
offer lower prices and/or innovations in contract form; d) larger dominant players are 
initially reluctant to respond, but over time have lowered their prices and also 
innovated, and become more professional and more competitive in their approach; e) 
the speed and nature of market response to spot market changes is also influenced by 
the ownership of market participants and the extent of vertical integration. 
 
                                                 
69 The proportion of UK residential customers with another (non-incumbent) supplier increased steadily 
from zero in 1998 to about 40 per cent in 2003. In 2004 and early 2005 there was a strong burst of 
switching in response to hitherto unknown price increases, but the proportion of customers with non-
incumbent suppliers increased to only 42 per cent by March 2005. In the 12 months to March 2005 
15% of customers changed supplier but only 2% net switched from incumbents to non-incumbents. 
(Ofgem, personal communication) 
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There is obviously scope for more systematic economic and statistical analysis of 
these markets. It would be interesting to extend the analysis to costs and margins, and 
to make comparisons with competitive retail electricity markets in the UK and 
elsewhere, and also with other markets generally. Whether or not marketing costs and 
retail margins in the electricity sector are higher than they used to be, are they higher 
than observed in other comparable markets? 
 
Nonetheless, some implications for policy can be drawn even at this stage. The 
Nordic markets have shown that ‘retail competition works’. Competitive markets can 
indeed provide not only a variety of prices and a choice of supplier, but also a 
significant range of ‘value-added services’. Comparison with other countries suggests 
that restrictions on prices and other terms of provision have tended to discourage or 
distort retail competition there. Importantly, this is not simply in terms of price and 
number of competitors: these more restricted markets seem to be characterised by less 
innovation and less variety of contracts and services than are the Nordic markets.  
 
In some countries there has been resistance to opening residential electricity markets 
to competition. There have also been proposals to rely on price controls or other 
regulatory arrangements instead of competition. Such proposals have not 
acknowledged the wide range of decisions that then need to be taken by regulators 
instead of being left to customers and suppliers in the market. 
 
For example, regulators are required to design a uniform product and impose it on all 
customers, to assess the future path of wholesale spot and forward contract prices, to 
indicate the appropriate purchasing and pricing policy for incumbent monopoly 
suppliers, to assess the various risks involved and to allocate them between producers, 
suppliers and customers. Proposals for regulation instead of retail competition have 
not explained why this would be sensible: why a uniform product is preferable to a 
variety of products, how regulators are to discover the most efficient patterns of 
wholesale purchasing and the preferences of customers at any time, and how they are 
to implement, monitor and continually revise this uniform product and associated 
purchasing policies as market conditions evolve.  
 
Meanwhile, the Nordic markets have shown that retail competition works well. 
Residential customers and competing suppliers have proved quite capable of making 
their own mutually agreeable arrangements for purchasing and pricing power. At the 
same time they are agreeing how to share the inevitable risks of underlying 
movements in wholesale market prices. These arrangements are continually evolving 
and improving. Whether alternative regulatory arrangements can achieve this 
responsiveness, efficiency and flexibility remains to be demonstrated. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A.1 Physical characteristics of the Nordic markets 
 
Table 11 sets out some physical characteristics of the three Nordic electricity markets, 
with data from the UK for comparison. The three countries vary between themselves 
in many respects, but have much in common compared to other countries. Thus 
Sweden has nearly twice the population of Norway or Finland, but all three countries 
are an order of magnitude less populated than the UK and many other European 
countries. Total electricity generation in each country is relatively high. Consumption 
per capita is between two and four times the UK level, which is about the average 
OECD level. 
 
Average electricity consumption per household, which is about 4 MWh per year in the 
UK, is double that level in Finland and Sweden, and four times that level in Norway. 
UK regulators take typical Low, Medium and High domestic consumption as using 
1.65, 3.3 and 6.6 MWh/year respectively. In the Nordic countries the benchmarks are 
2, 5 and 20 MWh/year, respectively. In the UK about one sixth of households have 
Economy 7 meters for overnight electric heating. In contrast, over 20 per cent of 
residential properties are electrically heated in Finland, over 30 per cent in Sweden, 
and most in Norway.70 
 
Table 11 Physical characteristics of Nordic electricity markets 
 
Country units Norway Sweden Finland Great Britain source
   
Population  m 2003 4.6 9.0 5.2 60.3 STEM 2004
Electricity generation TWh 2003 107 132 80 363 STEM 2004
Consumption per 
capita 
MWh/yr 
2004 
26.4 16.2 16.6 6.3 IEA Dec 2004
Household 
consumption 
TWh 2003 31 37? 18 112 Lewis et al 2004 
Ofgem 78/04 p.7
Number households m 2.2 4.6 2.8 26 
Average consumption  
per household 
MWh/yr 16 8 7 4 
Typical apartment MWh/yr 2 2 2 1.65 
Typical house MWh/yr 5 5 5 3.3 
Typical house with 
electric heating 
MWh/yr 20 20 20 6.6 
 
A.2 Generation characteristics of the Nordic markets 
 
Table 12 shows that the individual Nordic wholesale generation markets are relatively 
concentrated. The figures are indicative rather than precise, but the largest generator 
in each market seems to account for about 40 to 50 per cent of total output (taking 
account of cross-ownership holdings), compared to around 20 per cent in the UK. The 
top three generators account for up 60 per cent, compared to about 40 per cent in the 
UK. In all four countries a rump of smaller generators accounts for nearly a third of 
the market.  
                                                 
70 Lewis et al 2004, p. 76. 
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Table 12 Generation characteristics of Nordic markets 
 
Country units Norway Sweden Finland Great 
Britain 
source
Generation market shares (approximate) 
Largest 1 % 45-50 45-50 <40 20 
Largest 3 % 55-60 55-60 45-50 40 
Largest 6 % 60 60 >60 60 
STEM 2004 
Hydro share of 
generation 
% 2003 99-100 40-50 12-25 0-1 STEM 2004 
Lewis et al  2004
Imports share of 
generation 
% 2003 7 10 6 3 STEM 2004
Isolation frequency 
(capital cities) 
% 2003 24 0 29 n.a. STEM 2004 
 
 
The largest four Nordic companies - Vattenfall (Sweden), Fortum (Finland), Statkraft 
(Norway) and Sydfraft (Sweden) - have a significant presence in all three national 
markets. However, there is significant competition across the Nordic market as a 
whole. These four companies have market shares ranging from 47% to 19% in their 
own countries, but their shares of the whole Nordic market range from 17 to 8%.71 
 
Interconnectors between the national transmission networks can take much but not all 
of the desired traffic. The result is that, for the most part, the countries have access to 
the price in the Nord Pool, and it is legitimate to talk of a ‘Nordic market’. However, 
the capital cities in Norway and Finland (and other areas) are ‘isolated’ by 
transmission capacity constraints for around a quarter of the time, at which times 
different local prices apply as the markets are ‘split’. The constituent markets are also 
characterised by varying degrees of dependency on hydro-electric power. Depending 
on annual climate conditions, the share of hydropower might range from about 12 to 
25% in Finland and from 40 to 50% in Sweden, but in Norway is usually 99-100%. 
(This compares with 1 % or less in the UK.) The extent of hydro electricity has 
implications for market prices and risks, as noted in the text. 
 
A.3 Components of electricity prices in Sweden 
 
Table 13 sets out the various components of the total price of electricity, for the three 
main types of residential customers of different sizes.72 In round terms, the energy 
component accounts for 30 to 40 per cent of the total, network charges for 20 to 25 
per cent, and various types of tax for about 40 per cent.73 The illustration is for 
Sweden: there would be some differences for the other two Nordic countries.74 
 
                                                 
71 Bergman 2005 Table 2, citing Swedish Energy Agency. See also Lewis et al 2004 on the Nordic 
wholesale market and Olsen and Skytte 2003 on market power. 
72 About 24% of all residential customers in Sweden have houses with electric heating, 30% have 
homes or cottages without electric heating, and 44% have apartments. The Electricity Year 2003, 
Swede Energy, Table 2, p. 13. 
73 STEM 2004, Table 1 p. 11, p. 24, Table 9 p. 25.  
74 Network charges seem to be a little higher in Finland and Denmark (around 25 ore/kWh) and higher 
still in Norway (about 30 ore/kWh). On the other hand, the energy tax is lower in Norway (10.3 
ore/kWh) and Finland (6.3 ore/kWh) but much higher in Denmark (61.8 ore/kWh). In most other 
countries, not least the UK with VAT at 5%, the proportion of energy taxes would be much lower. 
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Table 13 Components of the total electricity price in Sweden 1 January 2004 
Cost item House with electric 
heating 
House without 
electric heating 
Apartment 
 Ore/kWh % Ore/kWh % Ore/kWh % 
Energy price 48.0 40 50.7 35 55.8 31 
Network charges 22.1 18 40.1 27 46.2 26 
Electricity tax 24.1 20 24.1 16 24.1 14 
Electricity certif.   2.2   2   2.2   2   2.2   1 
VAT @ 25% 24.1 20 29.3 17 32.1 18 
Total price 120.5 100 146.4 100 178.5 100 
   
For a variety of reasons, electricity prices in Sweden have been increasing over the 
last two decades. For a large domestic household, the total price increased from a low 
of under 45 ore/k/wh in 1988 to about 65 ore/kWh in 1998.75 Deregulation led to 
competitive wholesale trading and to steadily falling wholesale prices after 1996, 
broken by spot price increases in 2001 and 2002.76 Network charges increased from 
1997 to 2004: by about 4 % for a house with electric heating, and by 11 or 12 % for 
smaller homes. There were also increases in the electricity tax, which more than 
doubled from 1996 to 2004, and electricity certificates were introduced in 2003 to pay 
for renewable energy. The net effect was that the total energy price for a large 
household rose from about 55 ore/kWh in 1995 to about 65 ore/kWh in 1998, fell 
back to 60 ore/kWh in 2000 and early 2001, but by end 2003 was nearly 110 
ore/kWh, roughly double what it had been in 1995.77 By early 2005 the price had 
fallen back to about 75 ore/kWh. 
 
Energy prices have also become slightly more differentiated over this period. 
Compared to the average house without electric heating (using 5000 kWh/year), the 
discount for a house with electric heating (20,000 kWh/year) has increased from 18 to 
22 per cent, while the premium for an apartment (2000 kWh/year) has increased from 
under 10 to 12 per cent. This presumably reflects in large part the increased 
proportion of the bill now accounted for by network charges and electricity taxes, as 
well as the force of competition in relating prices more closely to the underlying costs 
of serving each type of customer. 
                                                 
75 Energy in Sweden Some Facts and Figures, Svensk Energi, May 2005 at www.svenskenergi.se.  
76 STEM 2004, pp 24-26. 
77 Svensk Energy May 2005. Estimated total prices in January 1997 were 71.1, 91.6 and 100.3 
ore/kWh, hence increases of 69%, 60% and 78% for the three types of residential housing, respectively. 
STEM 2004 as before. 
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